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Romania's contribution to the cause of the United Nations would  be significant, leading to shortness of 
the war with about 200 days and giving them significant strategic, material and human advantage. Despite the 
fact that Romania’s economic war effort was figured at the enormous amount of 1,200,000,000 dollars, foreign 
currency in 1938, this would assure the country  an honorable place four in the hierarchy of the United Nations 
which led the fight against Germany the cobeligeranta status, truly deserved by the state would be refused 
because of  political considerations known only by Great Powers. Among all the states in a situation somehow 
similar to that of Romania, none made such a huge military and economic effort in defeating the Nazi war 
machine. 
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Romania's participation in the Second 
World War was driven by political 
considerations and strategic needs arising 
from international political developments in 
the mid-twentieth century. The loss of an area 
of approximately 1 / 3 of the national territory 
and that of 6 million inhabitants, in favour of 
the three neighbors of Romania: the Soviet 
Union, Hungary and Bulgaria would 
constitute the main reason for Romania's 
participation to the military operations on 
both fronts, the east and west during the 
Second World War1. 
It can not be said that Romania did 
not try to avoid at all costs participating to 
this war. From September 1939 until June 
1941, the foreign policy of the state would be 
subordinated to the idea of nonbeligeranta 
and neutrality2. Nevertheless, the beginning 
of the  war would  get Romania involved, as a 
consequence of the  sad events of the summer 
 
1 Aurică Simion, Dictatul de  al Viena, Editura Albatros, 
Bucureşti 1996, passim. 
2 Ion Constantin: România, Marile Puteri şi problema 
Basarabiei, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti,1995,   p 27-
41 
of 19403, so that, on 22 June 1941 Romanian 
troops would cross the Prut, asa a command 
of general Ion Antonescu4.   
The outbreak of the Second World 
War would get the Romanian army totally by 
surprise in regard to the requirements of 
modern war. Romanian military staff, despite 
its number, lacked in the war modern 
technique and equipment required by such a 
conflagration5. 
"The wall of fire and steel", provided 
by the country's leaders to the people and the 
public opinion, presented as a difficult 
obstacle in the way of invaders, would soon 
prove to beas the big bluff propaganda of 
theCharles II royalist authority. In a few 
weeks, Romania's borders would collapse 
under the action of the most important 
                                                 
3 Mihai Bărbulescu, Dennis Deletant, Keith Hitchins, 
Şerban, Papacostea,Pompiliu Teodor,  Istoria României, 
Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1999, p 449-451. 
4 Flotin Constantiniu, Ilie Schipor, Trecerea Nistrului 
1941, Editura Albatros, Bucureşti 1995, p 163-170.  
4 Alessandru Duţu, Florica Dobre,Leonida Loghin, Armata 
română în cel de al doilea război mondial 1941-1945, 
Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1999, p 213-214. 
5 G-ral lt (r) ing Tiberiu Urdăreanu, Factorul tehnic în 
războaiele României Moderne, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 
1994, p 153-173; 183-258. 
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political and military forces of the moment, 
Germany and the USSR and the rule of 
Charles II would not be able to survive this 
collapse. 
The new leader of the state, Ion 
Antonescu, began immediately the 
reconstruction of the army,  being aware of 
the fact that the conduct of the international 
political events would have given  Romanians 
the chance to rebuild again and borders, 
bringing in frontiers a single state on all those 
who were temporarily under foreign 
domination. Antonescu would engage with 
the Axis powers in the war against the Soviet 
Union, firmly convinced of military and 
political success that they will gain.  
Campaign military army on the Eastern Front 
was the main objective of the issue of 
Basarabia and Northern Bucovina, territories 
that had been broken body of the country by 
the Soviet Union following the ultimatum 
notes in June 1940. Is not less true that Ion 
Antonescu and hope in a re-evaluation of 
Romania's position in Germany and the return 
of Transylvania, which Hungary will send her 
troops on the Eastern Front, declaring war, 
the Soviet Union6.   
Due  the alliance with Germany, the 
two provinces would be issued during the 
month of July with human sacrifices and 
great political controversy held on the 
sidelines of the continuation or not of anti-
war beyond the river will burst with fury 
among opposition political "historical parties 
and the cabinet of Marshal Ion Antonescu7. 
Obviously, the head of state will win the 
question and soldiers Romanian big will fight 
in Russia, making their special courage 
evidence, along with the German allies, not 
once will thank you for the support and 
sacrifices made8.  
 
6 Florin Constantiniu, P.C.R., Pătrăşcanu şi Transilvania 
(1945-1946), Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2001, p 
51. “Singurul motiv pentru care am trimis armata 
împotriva ruşilor au fost românii”, afirma premierul 
Ungariei Miklós Kállay, între anii 1942-1944. 
7 Valeriu-Florin Dobrinescu, Ion Constantin, Basarabia în 
anii celui de al doilea război mondial, Institutul European, 
Iaşi, 1995, p216.221. 
8 Constantin Kiriţescu,  România în al doilea război 
mondial, Editua Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureşti 1995, p 
187-192. 
The loss of the  three major battles 
supported by  the Romanian troops alongside  
Germany at Stalingrad in Crimea and on the 
front  from Iasi - Moldavia - Chisinau, would 
have the proportions of military 
disaster,tracing the unfortunate course and 
end  of the military campaign  on the Eastern 
front, which took three years and two months 
(June 22 1941-23 August 1944). The army’s 
defeat on the front of Moldavia during the 
Soviet offensive Iasi-Kishinev, in conjunction 
with the coup d’etat and arrest of Marshal and 
his closest collaborators, would pave 
Romania's exit from the alliance with 
Germany, against a country which, with all 
the blame to have deprived us of an important 
part of national territory, became a 
"companion in arms of our traditional allies. 
In the new context, the Romanian 
authorities from Bucharest would succeed in 
coping with the German’s anger, the 
Romanian troops  releasing the single largest 
part of the national territory, including the 
capital, and covering the conduct and 
submission of the Soviet army. Regarding the 
significance and importance of the act from 
Aug. 23 along the time, it would change 
substancially, according to political 
developments. However, the implementation 
of the volta-face by the Romanian troops 
would not be exempted from unpleasant 
events, spent specifically on the front of 
Moldavia. As soon as the army units on the 
front received the order to stop the fire 
against the Soviet army and withdraw 
immediately South the fortified line Focsani-
Nămoloasa-Braila, unit commanders would 
obey the order M.St. M., which expressed the 
sovereign will and would cease hostilities 
against the Red Army, trying to save what 
had left from the Romanian army, after 
breaking the front by the Soviets.  
Soviet Commands would not take 
into account this new situation, ordering to 
the fronts II and III of Ukraine troops to 
continue the offensive against the enemy, the 
result being the  capture of a significant 
number of Romanian soldiers who had 
stopped fighting and  them being made  
prisoners of war ,situation which would be 
extended curiously, until September 12, and, 
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sporadically, even after that date. This would 
be also the case of the fleet crews from the 
Danube Delta and the Black Sea, bound to 
cease fire, following the order received from 
the Romanian authorities, after being forced 
to land on board the ship and placed in Soviet 
camps. In consequence, most of the 
Romanian commercial fleet and, of course, 
the entire fleet of war would be lost, 
requisitioned by the Soviets9.  
Cases where took place the capture of 
Romanian soldiers by the Soviet troops 
would continue even after signing the 
Armistice on September 12, and the 
curiously, in regions where military 
operations had not been unfolded between the 
Romanian-Soviet forces, such as Wallachia. 
All this took place while the army’s soldiers 
were forced to face and attack the German 
troops, who received Fuhrer’s order to restore 
the situation in Romania, which threatened to 
crash the entire German military in the 
Balkans.   
On 23 August 1944 it is ended the 
Romanian military campaign, but not without 
heavy losses in terms of the number of people  
who had disappeared in  fighting, not to 
mention  the material losses suffered during 
the bombardments. Romania was Germany’s 
most important ally on the Eastern Front, 
possessing in 1942 a number of 26 Romanian 
divisions, in comparision to the eight Italian 
ones, 12 Hungarian and a fluctuating number 
of Finnish military. As a result of this 
impressive military number, from those 46 
allied military units taken by the Germans on 
the Eastern front, more than half were formed 
by the Romanians, fact which explains the 
huge human loses An information note to the 
Statistical Service of the army in October 
1945, relating to the human losses during the 
campaign in  East evaluated the figure 
309,533 troops, mentioning that in  this figure 
included both those who were killed and 
those taken prisoners on the battlefield,the 
Romanian General Staff, not having a clear 
situation about: deceased and 
prisoners.Important enough would the 
economic costs be of war with Germany, on 
August 23 in 1944 when finding the 
 
                                                
9 Arh M.Ap.N., fond 948, dosar  10, 45 
Romanian economy controlled by the 
German capital, German claims being 
calculated at a value of about 1.5 billion 
German marks10. Mobilizing an important 
military contingent would considerably 
weaken the capacities of Romanian industrial 
production forced to maintain the same levels 
of production with increased efforts. 
Moreover, the transition of the economy on 
war footing would create an important 
financial channel and economic resources 
which, normally, used to be spnet in other 
purposes, the special costs requiring the 
maintenance of the Romanian troops from the 
front.The allied bombardments, carried out 
particularly on the main economic centers 
would cause considerable losses to the 
Romanian economy specially to the oil 
industry, simultaneously being registered 
considerable human losses. Among the 
indirect deficits caused  to Romania's 
economy would be listed, especially, non-
equivalent exchange of currencies between 
the two countries, increasing the German 
mark artificially in comparison to the  
Romanian leu, causing an unjustified increase 
of the imported products price  in Germany in 
comparison with the Romanian goods 
exported, and also an increased purchasing 
power of the German soldiers, which emptied 
the Romanian market of certain products, by 
artificially boosting the price.  
The maintenance of the German 
troops on Romanian territory, the system of 
payments, the deductions arising from the 
activities of transport and communications 
would be other "hot spots" of the 
collaboration with the Third Reich in the anti 
Soviet war. While German military units and 
firms of import-export were making their 
supplies with main products at low price 
goods imported from Germany were totally 
unrepresentative for the needs of the 
Romanian market, the prices being much 
steep. Romania’s complex situation on the 
international plane made it extremely 
vulnerable to the claims of its German ally, 
who was aware of the lack of any side effect 
from such a economic colaboration with the 
 
10 N.N.Constantinescu, Istoria Economiei Naţionale, 
Editura Economică, Bucureşti, 2000, vol II, p 60 
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Romanians. All these considerations, which 
cast a shadow on the Romanian-German 
cooperation, resulted from the fact that, once 
having accepted the participation in the 
military campaign from the east, the 
Romanian authorities had overlooked the 
"little details of the collaboration," although 
the legal situation of the Romanian state was 
similar to that of an independent and 
sovereign state which was fighting against a 
common enemy. The arms comradeship 
between the soldiers of the two armies did not 
result from the terms of a treaty of military or 
political alliance, Romania participating in 
the war on its own initiative, in order to 
eliberate Basarabia and Bucovina.  
The events of Aug. 23 would 
radically change the political conditions of 
Romania, being forced tofight for the same 
cause, along with its former enemies and 
against its former allies. This turning of 
Romania in running the war, besides the 
considerable advantages brought to the U.S. 
cause, would be made with enormous costs, 
the Romanian authorities and the army staff " 
confronting with the two enemies",fact which 
cost Romania a large number of taken 
prisoners by the Soviet troops.  
 Despite these significant losses of 
men, material and war technique, Romania 
would be able to align on 23 August, thanks 
to a policy of cautious carried  by the 
Romanian General Staff, 5 operational 
divisions, plus 29 other divisions, made up 
mostly of recruits and other regular elements 
cbillet to the sedentary services of the troops 
on the battlefield. The Romanian military 
units from the front area, being disruptive and 
largely destroyed as a consequence of the 
Soviet offensive, the military campaign 
against the Nazi Germany would be made 
with these divisions of recruits, maintained 
constantly in the country by the General 
Staff.    
The Armistice Convention signed 
between Romania and the United Nations on 
12 September 1944 would create the general 
frame for the unfolding of Romania's military 
campaign against Germany and its satellites. 
The implementation of its clauses was the 
responsibility of an allied Committee (Soviet) 
of Control, which according to agreements of 
the Great Threee, Romania would be the 
Soviet Union concern. The brutal interference 
of the Control committee would decisively 
affect the internal political events, destroying 
the state budget by collecting a massive 
supply, raised in the Convention truce.  
Having decided to urgently improve 
the Romanian-Soviet relations and the issue 
of Transylvania, the Romanian authorities 
would send to the front a larger number of 
military units than the 12 divisions set in the 
armistice agreement, passing to the fulfilling 
of the economic tasks of the convention.  In 
regard of the number of Romanian soldiers 
engaged in the military operations against the 
German troops, these were about 538,536 
soldiers, from a total of 1,100,000 ones 
mobilized and put at the disposal of the 
United Nations. Romanian armies  covered 
from 23 August 1944 and 12 May 1945 about 
1700 km in an average of 6 km per day, 
forced 12 water courses, 20 mountain 
massife, conquered 3831 localities of which 
53 major cities. All these weapons were made 
with the sacrifice of 169,822 dead, wounded 
and missing soldiers. Romania's contribution 
to the cause of the United Nations would be 
significant, leading to shortness of the war 
with about 200 days and giving them 
significant strategic, material and human 
advantage.  
Despite the fact that Romania’s 
economic war effort was figured at the 
enormous amount of 1,200,000,000 dollars, 
foreign currency in 1938, this would assure 
the country an honorable place four in the 
hierarchy of the United Nations which led the 
fight against Germany the cobeligeranta 
status, trully deserved by the state would be 
refused because of political considerations 
known only by Great Powers. Among all the 
states in a situation somehow similar to that 
of Romania, none made such a huge military 
and economic effort in defeating the Nazi war 
machine.   
Although fluctuating due to signing 
of the military Romanian-Soviet protocol 
from October 26, the Romanian military staff 
remained involved on the theatre of 
operations, would be situated permanently 
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over the limits imposed by the Convention 
truce. Moreover, Romania’s contribution was 
absolute, the population and the authorities 
making efforts to support the military 
campaign of the Romanian troops. No 
military organizations or other type of 
associations or military units did continued 
fighting after the return of UN weapons 
against Germany on 23 August. For example, 
Italy contributed with 100,000 partisans due 
to the United Nations, while 5 infantry 
divisions and 2 escadroane aviation would 
continue the struggle in Northern Italy against 
Germany. In the case of Hungary there 
were10 divisions, Bulgaria - a division pro-
fascist, Yugoslavia - 3 divisions, 9 brigades 
plus a division of the guard and a cavalry. In 
France the number of those who continued 
fighting against the Allies would be up to a 
division and in Poland at around of 20-25.000 
troops.The memorandum submitted by 
Romania at the Peace Conference in Paris, 
recalled, beside the war and military effort 
made our country, the amount of the 
obligations fulfilled up to 1 July 1945, 
presented in article no. 3 of the Convention 
according to which it was amounted  the sum 
of  77 billion, foreign currency in 1938. 
  
 The so long desired and hailed defeat 
of the Nazi Germany by the majority of the 
peoples of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 
will not be an occasion of true joy, because of 
the alternative communist system, brutally 
imposed by the Soviet model, would be 
repudiated in most of the eastern societies, 
totally confused by the war and the "Red 
Army liberaration." Hundred thousands of 
people were going to fully feel the "benefits 
of the Soviet liberation and the consequence 
their political transformation systems into 
popular regimes of Soviet inspiration11.  
Imposing through violence a new 
"popular type of democracy" in the states in 
the from the Central and South-Eastern 
Europe would contribute to stagnation of 
their economy, the costs for recovery being 
paid by all of us even today, after 50 years 
since the events occurred.No one speaks 
 
11 Stephen Fischer Galaţi, Europa de Est şi Războiul Rece, 
Institutul European, Iaşi, 1996, p 24. 
about the moral discomfort, personal 
dissatisfaction or fear that all these people 
from those countries had to cope with, 
specially the prisoners of war. They passed 
from the status of real heroes on the 
battlefield to that of traders, who could not 
adjust to the new ideology of the communist 
regime, being blamed for having fought 
against the Soviet Union and upset the "Big 
brother" from East, the European states which 
would  face a social and economic evoulution 
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